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The remaining carbon budget represents the total amount of CO2 that can still be emitted 
in the future while limiting global warming to a given temperature target. The range of 
carbon budget estimates is wide, however, and can be used to either trivialize the most 
ambitious mitigation targets as by characterizing them as impossible, or to argue that there 
is ample time to allow for a gradual transition to a low-carbon economy. Neither of these 
extremes is consistent with our best understanding of the policy implications of carbon 
budgets. Understanding the scientific and socio-economic uncertainties affecting the size of 
the remaining carbon budgets, as well as the methodological choices and assumptions that 
underlie their calculation, is essential before applying them as a policy tool. Here we discuss 
uncertainties affecting remaining carbon budget estimates, provide recommendations on 
how to calculate them in a consistent and transparent way, and discuss their implications 
for both international and national climate policies. 
Here we provide recommendations on how to calculate the remaining carbon budgets in a 
consistent and transparent way, discuss their implications for both international and 
national climate policies, as well as related uncertainties. 
Remaining carbon budgets are defined as the allowable future CO2 emissions that are consistent 
with meeting climate targets such as those of the Paris Agreement (see Box 1). Conceptually, the 
idea of a global emissions budget is a compelling way to frame and communicate the climate 
mitigation challenge: a finite cap on total CO2 emissions implies clearly that global CO2 
emissions must eventually reach net-zero to stabilize global temperatures. Estimates of the 
remaining carbon budget are subject to large uncertainty, but have also varied considerably 
among studies owing to the lack of a consistently applied definition, as well as different 
methodological approaches used to calculate the remaining budgets1,2. Furthermore, additional 
uncertainties are introduced in the process of disaggregating the global budget into national 
shares for domestic climate policy3–5. Given the increasing adoption of carbon budget estimates 
as a benchmark for national policy discussions, the full range of uncertainties and choices 
surrounding carbon budget estimates must be articulated and understood. 
In this Perspective, we present an overview of the state of our understanding of the remaining 
carbon budget, with the intent of charting a tractable path through the scientific, policy and 
ethical considerations required when applying the carbon budget concept to climate policy 
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decisions. We characterize the uncertainties and other factors affecting estimates of the 
remaining carbon budget across four broad categories: (1) geophysical uncertainties associated 
with physical climate and carbon cycle processes that determine the climate response to 
emissions; (2) socioeconomic uncertainties that reflect the societal choices and dynamics that 
determine future emission scenarios; (3) methodological approaches that reflect choices and 
assumptions made when estimating the global remaining carbon budget; and (4) allocation 
choices that emerge from the range of ethical and fairness principles that can be used to allocate 
a portion of the global budget to individual countries, economic sectors and entities such as 
individual industries and corporations. We discuss each of these in turn, and then offer some 
concluding thoughts that summarize the robust policy implications of a finite remaining carbon 
budget. 
Box 1: What is a “remaining carbon budget”? 
Here, a remaining carbon budget is the quantity of cumulative or total CO2 emissions that is consistent with 
limiting global mean warming to a given temperature level. The term “budget” is analogous to a fixed total 
financial budget, in that spending in excess of annual budget amounts in the near-term requires decreased 
spending in the future to not exceed the total budget. Here, we distinguish between the total and the remaining 
carbon budget: (1) the total carbon budget is defined as the total amount of CO2 emissions since the pre-
industrial reference period that is consistent with a specified peak temperature increase; and (2) the remaining 
carbon budget, which represents the amount of CO2 that can still be emitted from present-day onwards while 
staying below the temperature target1,2. In both cases, these budgets refer to a total quantity of CO2 emissions 
(from fossil fuels and land-use change) up to the point in time that CO2 emissions reach net-zero. Importantly, 
this quantity applies to only CO2 emissions, and does not apply to allowable CO2-equivalent emissions of other 
gases and aerosols (e.g., methane and nitrous oxide, as calculated using global warming potentials). 
There are several variants of carbon budgets that have been used in the literature (e.g. threshold exceedance 
budget, threshold avoidance budget, threshold return budget and overshoot budget; see Ref.1 and Ref.6 for a 
discussion of these variants). We do not use these terms further, and we recommend that they be used only if 
necessary to explore the sensitivity of carbon budget estimates to different types of emission scenarios or 
estimation methods. 
Another common but distinct use of the term “carbon budget” is to describe the balance of historical sources and 
sinks of CO2 in the Earth system or for a particular region. In this alternative usage, the term “budget” is similar 
to annual financial accounting in a closed system without deficits, whereby the sum of the individual positive and 
negative line items must equal zero. As a prominent example, the Global Carbon Project annually publishes a 
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historical global carbon budget, defined as the mean, variations and trends associated with the human 
perturbation to the global carbon cycle up to present-day7. This historical global carbon [cycle] budget combines 
fossil fuel and land-use CO2 emissions (or sources) with increases in atmospheric, land and ocean carbon 
reservoirs (also referred to as sinks) and places these sources and sinks in the context of natural carbon cycle 
processes.  
 
Geophysical basis of carbon budgets 
The proportionality between cumulative CO2 emissions and CO2-induced temperature change is 
the primary geophysical basis for a finite remaining carbon budget: each additional tonne of CO2 
emitted leads to an incremental temperature increase, which implies that CO2 emissions must 
decrease to net-zero to stabilize global temperature8. This proportionality is quantified by the 
Transient Climate Response to cumulative CO2 Emissions (TCRE), which defines the transient 
warming per unit cumulative CO2 emissions in a scenario with increasing CO2 emissions (see 
Box 2). The allowable cumulative CO2 emissions for a given amount of warming are therefore 
proportional to the inverse of the TCRE1,9. However, this relationship only holds for the warming 
caused by CO2, and not for additional warming (or cooling) caused by other emissions or 
forcings (e.g., methane, aerosols, or nitrous oxide). 
Using the TCRE to estimate the remaining carbon budget for a given temperature target therefore 
requires an additional estimate of the non-CO2 contribution to future warming1,9–11. One approach 
is to define an “Effective TCRE” to estimate the total anthropogenic warming at a given amount 
of cumulative CO2 emissions11–13 (see Box 2). However, unlike the TCRE, there is no 
geophysical basis for the Effective TCRE to remain constant in time.  In particular, where the 
TCRE is approximately scenario-independent14,15, this does not hold for the Effective TCRE 
which is affected by the changing rate of emissions of non-CO2 forcers with mostly shorter 
atmospheric lifetimes16. Consequently, while the Effective TCRE can be used to estimate the 
total carbon budget directly12, it is important to use an estimated value of the Effective TCRE at 
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Figure 1: Relationship between the TCRE, the Effective TCRE, and the total and remaining carbon budgets.     
(a) Idealized representation of the TCRE, Effective TCRE and related total and remaining carbon budgets. Here, we 
show the central estimate of the TCRE (0.45 °C per 1000 Gt CO2) and an Effective TCRE value of 0.53 °C per 1000 
Gt CO2 at 1.5°C, which corresponds to the median (50th percentile) remaining carbon budget of 580 Gt CO2 from 
2018 onwards reported in the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C (SR1.5; Ref.9, Table 2.2 therein). The 67th (420 Gt 
CO2) and 33rd (840 Gt CO2) percentile budgets are shown in lighter red, reflecting uncertainty in the TCRE only. 
Other contributions to uncertainty are shown by bars below the plot, showing the amount by which these additional 
processes affect the median budget estimate (Ref. 9, Table 2.2 therein). (b) Simulated climate response to CO2 
emissions only (blue) and all anthropogenic drivers (red) for scenarios from the SR1.5 scenario database17,18, using 
the simple model emulator MAGICC7(Refs. 19,20) with parameter settings corresponding to a TCRE of 0.44°C per Gt 
CO2. Temperature change is shown relative to the 1850-1900 period, and cumulative CO2 emissions are calculated 
from the central year of that period (year 1875). Dots mark the peak warming and the lines end at the point of net-
zero CO2 emissions in each scenario. The larger spread of red dots relative to purple shows the additional effect of 




Box 2: The Transient Climate Response to cumulative CO2 Emissions 
A close to proportional relationship between CO2-induced global warming and cumulative CO2 emissions is an 
emergent property of a range of Earth-system models14,15,21–23. The Transient Climate Response to cumulative 
CO2 Emissions (TCRE) quantifies the temperature change per unit of cumulative CO2 emissions (often expressed 
as °C per 1000 PgC or per 1000 Gt CO2 emitted). In a climate model, the TCRE defines the temperature change 
per unit CO2 emissions at the time of doubled CO2, in an idealized experiment where atmospheric CO2 
concentration increases at a rate of 1% per year24,25. This TCRE value can then be used to describe the general 
linear relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and CO2-induced temperature change (Figure Box 1a, 
solid line, where the value of the TCRE defines the slope of this line).  
The TCRE has been shown to be a good predictor of warming caused by a given quantity of cumulative CO2 
emissions across a range of emissions scenarios15, though is subject to many uncertain processes that affect both 
its magnitude (the slope of the line) and its constancy in time (the robustness of the linear response to additional 
cumulative emissions) (Figure Box 1a). Among Earth system models, the magnitude of the TCRE is strongly 
related to the transient climate response (TCR) which accounts for at least half of the variation in TCRE 
values26,27; remaining TCRE variation is caused by varying carbon cycle sensitivity to global warming and 
increasing CO227 (Figure Box 1b). Model TCRE values are also (though to a lesser extent) related to their 
Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS), that is an estimate of the global warming in response to doubling of the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration once the Earth System reaches an equilibrium. Several models in the recent Sixth 
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project28 (CMIP6) have higher ECS values than the previous generation of 
models29 (CMIP5), most of which are also associated with high TCR and TCRE values. However, some of these 
high-ECS CMIP6 models have TCR and TCRE values that fall outside of estimates of the observationally-
constrained 5-95% range24,30,31 (Figure Box 2 b). Consequently, while these high-ECS models would predict 
smaller remaining carbon budgets, this should be considered a low-probability outcome given their current lower 
consistency with observed warming30,32. Such results can nevertheless be used to guide quantitative risk 
assessment of the implications of our imperfect knowledge of climate processes and the associated risks of low-
probability outcomes33.  
Importantly, the TCRE applies only to warming caused by CO2 emissions, and does not include the additional 
warming or cooling caused by non-CO2 emissions and other climate drivers. A common approach to incorporate 
the effect of non-CO2 forcing is to use simulations forced by all anthropogenic drivers, and plot the resulting total 
anthropogenic warming as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions. This results in a representation of total 
anthropogenic warming per unit cumulative CO2 emission that includes the effect of all climate drivers34,35. Here, 
we label this the “Effective TCRE” (following Ref.12), to define the total anthropogenic warming at a given 
quantity of cumulative CO2 emissions (Figure Box 1a, slope of dashed black line). The Effective TCRE is a 
measure of warming per unit cumulative CO2 emissions, equal to the TCRE plus an additional amount of 
scenario-dependent non-CO2 warming. This metric has been used conceptually or explicitly in several previous 
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studies to directly infer remaining carbon budgets associated with a given future emission scenario11–13,35–38. 
However, this needs to be done with an understanding that the Effective TCRE is not expected to remain constant 
in time (see Figure 1) due to its strong dependence on non-CO2 scenario variation and in particular on the 
potential unmasking of aerosol cooling in scenarios with rapid decreases in aerosol emissions16.  
(a)                                                                       (b) 
  
Figure Box 2. Uncertain processes affecting the relationship between warming and cumulative CO2 emissions. 
(a) Conceptual representation of the Transient Climate Response to cumulative CO2 Emissions (TCRE; the slope 
of the solid black line), and the Effective TCRE (represented by the dashed black line). Solid coloured arrows 
indicate scientific uncertainties affecting the value of the TCRE due to the climate (pink) and carbon cycle 
(orange) response to CO2 emissions24,26. Solid coloured lines indicate processes that may lead to deviations from 
a linear temperature response to cumulative emissions. Notable processes are the additional unrealized warming 
(or cooling) due past emissions that could occur as CO2 emissions approach zero39,40 (CO2 commitment; purple), 
permafrost carbon feedbacks41,42(green), and the increasing saturation of CO2 radiative forcing at high CO2 
levels43 (dark blue). Other nonlinear climate or carbon cycle processes act in both directions and tend to 
compensate each other (turquoise) leading to an approximately constant TCRE value across a wide range of 
cumulative CO2 emissions14,15,24,44. Dashed coloured lines indicate additional uncertainties affecting the Effective 
TCRE as a result of societal choices leading to different non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission scenarios9,10,16,35 
(dashed blue) and the warming response to decreased aerosol emissions45,46 (dashed red). (b) Relationship 
between model TCRE and TCR values in the CMIP5 models24,47,48 (triangles) and CMIP6 models26,30 (circles). 
Grey shading indicates the observationally-constrained TCR median (dashed line), likely range (>66%; dark 
grey) and 5-95% range (light grey), based on the 1981-2017 observed warming trend as a constraint based on 





Geophysical uncertainties affecting the remaining carbon budget 
Geophysical uncertainties affecting the TCRE (see Box 2) will propagate directly to uncertainties 
in estimates of the remaining carbon budget. In general, there are three types of geophysical 
uncertainties relevant to the TCRE that affect its robustness as a predictor of the remaining 
carbon budget. First, differing physical climate and carbon cycle responses to CO2 emissions 
alter the magnitude of the TCRE. Across Earth system models, TCRE values are generally 
proportional to models’ Transient Climate Response (TCR), though different carbon cycle 
responses will also produce a range of TCRE values among models with similar TCR values26,27 
(see Box 2). Better constraints on the TCR value as well as on the carbon cycle response to 
climate change and increasing CO2 would therefore have the effect of constraining both the 
TCRE and the remaining carbon budget. 
Second, the linearity of the TCRE relationship results from the compensation of individual non-
linear processes that act to both increase and decrease the sensitivity of the temperature response 
to additional cumulative CO2 emissions43,44,49,50. However, there is nevertheless the potential for 
strong non-linear changes in the strength of particular feedbacks to cause deviations from the 
TCRE-predicted linearity with increasing emissions. Examples include potential changes to the 
strength of physical climate feedbacks as a result of changing warming patterns51–53 or the 
behaviour of biogeochemical permafrost and wetland feedbacks that are currently poorly 
represented in Earth system models42,54. 
Third, while the TCRE has been shown to be a robust predictor of CO2-induced warming in 
scenarios with increasing CO2 emissions24,25, it is less clear that the TCRE will adequately 
capture the climate response to scenarios that rapidly decline to net-zero and/or net-negative CO2 
emissions41,55. In the event that there is unrealized warming or cooling from past CO2 emissions, 
this lagged temperature change would manifest during the time that CO2 emissions ramp down to 
zero, causing the temperature response to cumulative emissions to bend upwards or downwards 
relative to the linear TCRE line. This unrealized commitment from past CO2 emissions has 
recently been quantified across Earth system models39,40,56, and is likely an important contributor 
to uncertainty in the remaining carbon budget.   
Finally, the climate response to non-CO2 forcing changes is an important additional source of 
geophysical uncertainty affecting carbon budget estimates that is distinct from the contributions 
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to TCRE uncertainty discussed above (see “non-CO2 forcing and climate response” bar below 
Figure 1a; Ref.9). Given the prominence of aerosol forcing uncertainty in affecting the overall 
non-CO2 forcing uncertainty, this speaks to the importance of improved estimates of the climate 
response to present-day aerosol forcing in order to improve our ability to constrain estimates of 
the remaining carbon budget.   
Socioeconomic uncertainties affecting the remaining carbon budget 
Remaining carbon budget estimates are also strongly affected by socioeconomic uncertainties 
related to our ability to predict the dynamics of socio-political systems and the technological 
changes that determine the evolution of emissions in future scenarios. Given that the TCRE is 
relatively robust to variation in CO2 emission scenarios15,43,50, the relationship between the 
TCRE and the remaining carbon budget is only weakly affected by socioeconomic uncertainty. 
However, the effect of socioeconomic uncertainty is considerably more pronounced for estimates 
of future non-CO2 warming (see spread of total warming as a function of cumulative emissions 
across scenarios in Figure 1b, red dots). This relates to the shorter atmospheric lifetimes of many 
non-CO2 emissions, such that rapid decreases in emissions of short-lived positive climate forcers 
(such as methane, black carbon and ozone precursors) would effectively limit near-term warming 
caused by non-CO2 emissions57. Conversely, however, rapid decreases in aerosol emissions that 
produce a negative forcing would amplify non-CO2 warming16, a scenario that is likely to occur 
as a result of decarbonization efforts45,46,58. 
Although both geophysical and socioeconomic uncertainties can be reduced by further research, 
socioeconomic uncertainties are also sensitive to human decisions and choices regarding 
technological development and mitigation actions16. This means that policy decisions about 
where to focus mitigation efforts have the potential to influence the size of the remaining carbon 
budget by affecting the amount of warming that is caused by CO2 vs. other anthropogenic 
climate drivers6. The balance of effective mitigation of positive short-lived forcers and the 
potential aerosol warming commitment may be one of the most important determinants of the 
size of the remaining carbon budget. 
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Methodological choices and assumptions affecting remaining carbon budget estimates 
Using a consistent and transparent set of assumptions to calculate the remaining carbon budget is 
crucial in order to provide clear guidelines for climate policy. Yet, inconsistent choices are often 
used among different studies that report remaining carbon budget estimates, which unnecessarily 
inflates the spread of estimates1,2. Here, we provide guidelines and recommendations to estimate 
carbon budgets in a transparent and policy-relevant way, given the many choices and 
assumptions typically required (Table 1).  
First, we recommend estimating carbon budgets for anthropogenic warming only, independent of 
natural variability (e.g. as estimated by Ref.59); while this may seem like an obvious statement, it 
is nevertheless the case that climate policy temperature goals have not been consistently 
interpreted across different studies60. The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference 
in the climate system” (Article 2). This framing provides a clear rationale for limiting warming 
caused by all anthropogenic drivers, rather than that caused by the combined effect of 
anthropogenic warming and natural variability60.  
Second, we recommend that carbon budgets be defined in relation to a particular policy-relevant 
climate target. The Paris Agreement61 aims to keep global temperatures to “well below 2 °C” and 
to “pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial temperatures”. Consequently, 
carbon budgets associated with a range of temperature increases between 1.5 °C and “well below 
2 °C” are those with direct relevance for the Paris Agreement goal. Budgets for 2°C or higher 
can be used to gauge the amount of effort needed to stay below higher warming levels, but are 
outside the current policy framing of the Paris Agreement.  
Third, choices about the desired level of risk avoidance must be defined when estimating carbon 
budgets. Carbon budgets have typically been reported as corresponding to a 50% or 67% percent 
probability of staying below a given temperature target when the carbon budget is fully emitted, 
given known and quantified uncertainties35.  
Fourth, the proxy for the pre-industrial reference period that has been used in recent IPCC 
reports9,62 is the 1850-1900 average, which we recommend adopting for consistency with these 
analyses. We recognize that temperatures during this period may have already increased relative 
to the previous century59,63,64, though adopting an earlier baseline period is currently difficult 
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owing to limited observational data on both temperature and cumulative CO2 emissions prior to 
1850.  
Fifth, it is important to be explicit about the choice of temperature change metric. The relative 
merits of using a blended air-water temperature that is masked according to observational 
coverage (Global Mean Surface Temperature, GMST), a full-coverage global surface air 
temperature (GSAT), or a combination of the two, to represent observed historical warming have 
been discussed extensively elsewhere1,2,65; we do not offer a specific recommendation here other 
than that the choice of metric be clear and justified, both for historical warming and TCRE.  
Sixth, we recommend adopting our carbon budget definition of total emissions up to the point in 
time that CO2 emissions reach net-zero (see Box 1), which is likely to correspond closely to the 
timing of peak temperature change9. This choice also avoids the need for assumptions regarding 
the potential feasibility of net negative CO2 emissions to reverse temperature overshoots. For 
model simulations, this requires using emissions scenarios that contain internally-consistent CO2 
and non-CO2 emissions, which are also broadly consistent with a desired peak temperature 
target, rather than scenarios where temperatures exceed the target indefinitely or exceed (over-
shoot) and return to the target in question.  
For the other methodological choices listed in Table 1, our key recommendation is for each 
choice to be documented to clarify the assumptions embedded in analyses, and to discuss 
(quantitatively if possible) how choices may affect the results. Lack of clarity with respect to 
these assumptions and choices can result in widely varying carbon budget estimates that risk 
being applied inappropriately to policy questions. For example, carbon budget estimates that are 
based on the assumption that non-CO2 forcing will follow a high-emission scenario should not be 
applied uncritically to the case of ambitious mitigation scenarios with decreasing non-CO2 
emissions. Similarly, budget estimates using the GMST temperature metric are not well suited to 
estimate the requirements for avoiding climate impacts that have been calculated using GSAT 
change. Consistent and clear methodological choices are therefore critical to minimize the risk of 





Table 1: Choices and assumptions that are typically required when estimating total or remaining 
carbon budgets for global temperature targets. Where appropriate, recommended choices are 
marked with an asterisk (*). 
 
Choice Options Issues to consider 
Definition of global 
warming 
(*) Anthropogenic warming only Relevant to international climate targets aimed at limiting global 
temperature increase60; requires a method to isolate the anthropogenic 
contribution to observed or model-simulated temperature change24,59. 
Anthropogenic warming + natural climate 
variability 
Directly observable and simulated by global climate models; however, 
natural climate variability, whether externally forced (by volcanoes or 
solar activity) or unforced (i.e. internal variability of the climate system), 
causes inter-annual to decadal-scale warming or cooling trends that are not 
relevant to international climate goals60,66,67. 
Target temperature (*) 1.5 °C Most ambitious target level in the Paris Agreement. 
(*) “well below 2 °C” Primary Paris Agreement target, but not precisely defined. 
2 °C or higher Warming levels that exceed the Paris Agreement target range. 
Probability of not 
exceeding the target 
50%, 67%, 90% … Remaining carbon budgets are typically estimated to be in line with a 
50%, 67% or sometimes 90% probability of successfully limiting warming 
to the temperature threshold of interest. The choice of which budget to 
adopt as a global target depends on societal risk avoidance preferences. 
Pre-industrial 
reference period 
(*) 1850-1900 average 
 
Current proxy for pre-industrial climate62, corresponding with the 
beginning of available instrumental temperature records. 
1860-1880 average 
 
Period representing the first 20 years available in the HadCRUT 
temperature dataset68, at times used because no major volcanic eruption 
took place during these years.  
1720-1800 average 
 
Suggested by Ref.63 as a better estimate of climate conditions prior to 
human influence, but direct observations of global temperature are not 
available, and emissions uncertainty prior to 1850 is very large, posing 
difficulty for consistent estimates of historical cumulative emissions from 
earlier time periods. 
Temperature change 
metric 
Observed (blended air-water and/or 
masked) temperature (global mean 
surface temperature, or GMST) 
 
Directly observable; calculated as a combination of surface air 
temperatures over land and sea ice, with surface water temperature over 
ocean; incomplete spatial coverage69 unless infilling technique used to 
extrapolate to areas with no observations70; spatial definition changes over 
time as sea ice cover changes2.  
Global surface air temperature (GSAT). 
 
Average of surface air temperature with complete global coverage; typical 
output of global models, but not currently available from observational 
estimates of global temperature change; historical GSAT warming has 
been estimated to be about 0.1°C higher than that based on GMST71,72, 
though recent improvements to spatial infilling techniques in GMST 
products have decreased this difference. 
Nature of 
temperature change 
(*) Peak temperature The timing of peak temperature should match closely the timing of net-
zero CO2 emissions9 which avoids the need for assumptions related to the 
reversibility of temperature overshoots. 
Temperature at some level of cumulative 
emissions 
No strict limit on maximum temperature change: temperature may exceed 
the target after the point at which cumulative emissions are calculated. 
Temperature at some year (e.g. 2100) No strict limit on maximum temperature change: temperature may exceed 
target either before (overshoot and return scenarios) or after selected year. 
Non-CO2 scenario 
choice 
(*) Non-CO2 scenario consistent with 
CO2 emissions that decline to net-zero 
Requires an internally-consistent CO2 and non-CO2 emission scenario that 
is also consistent with the desired target, and/or an embedded economic 
model that generates consistent CO2 and non-CO2 emissions9,73. 
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Non-CO2 forcing consistent with high-
emissions (or other arbitrary) emission 
scenario 
Non-CO2 forcing is not consistent with mitigation efforts to limit warming 
to the target, potentially leading to either an under- or overestimate of the 
remaining carbon budget10,11,41. 
Treatment of aerosol 
forcing uncertainty 
Single model run for time-series of 
historical and future aerosol forcing  
Results are contingent on the model and/or forcing scenario used and do 
not include uncertainty associated with aerosol forcing or the climate 
response to decreased future aerosol emissions10. 
Assumed range of forcing Requires many model simulations or other methods to sample 
uncertainty9,22. 
Treatment of land-
use CO2 emissions 
Prescribed or treated as interchangeable 
with fossil fuel emissions 
Cumulative emissions from land-use are known, but biophysical and 
indirect carbon cycle effects of land-use change are not accounted for. 
Simulated by model from prescribed 
land-use change scenario 
Biophysical and other effects of land-use change accounted for, but 
cumulative emissions from land-use are complex to diagnose, often 
requiring additional simulations74–76. In the absence of diagnosed land-use 
emission information, some studies have assumed the same land-use 
change emissions in all model simulations36–38. 
Treatment of CO2 
zero emission 
commitment (ZEC) 
Assumed to be zero or negligible This is the approach taken by Ref. 9, but results in unquantified 
uncertainty associated with the ZEC. 
Assumed to have a positive or negative 
value 
When combined with a method that uses TCRE directly, a positive ZEC 
would reduce the remaining carbon budget to account for unrealized 
warming after CO2 emissions are halted1,56. Similarly, a negative ZEC 
would increase the remaining budget, but only if its timescale is shorter 
than the pace of emission reductions to net-zero CO2. 
Simulated by model using scenarios 
where CO2 emissions decrease to net-zero 
The effect of the CO2 ZEC is accounted for in simulations of ambitious 
mitigation scenarios, as any unrealized warming or cooling from past 
emissions would typically be realized during the time that emissions fall 
to zero.  
Treatment of 
overshoot scenarios / 
reversibility 
Climate response to carbon dioxide 
removal assumed to be the same as 
response to emissions 
Many recent studies are based on this assumption (see Ref. 1 for a 
summary of different studies). This assumption is not supported if the CO2 
warming commitment (ZEC) is non-zero77. 
Overshoot scenario simulated explicitly Resulting budget is specific to overshoot scenarios41,55. 
Overshoot scenarios excluded Resulting budget may not apply to overshoot scenarios42. 
Treatment of 
permafrost feedback 
Included in model simulation, or using 
TCRE from models that include this 
feedback 
Resulting budget does not need to be adjusted for this feedback41, but 
timescale is important as permafrost feedbacks have a long time 
constant78,79. 
Not included in model or using TCRE 
range from CMIP5 models 
Budget should be adjusted to account for the effect of this feedback, and 
timescale needs to be stated given the feedback’s time dependency9. 




Clarity about which feedbacks are 
included and which are not 
Representation and strength of feedbacks vary among models, which is 
part of the explanation for the existing TCRE range. In general, any new 
positive (amplifying) feedback would increase the TCRE (and decrease 
the budget), and a new negative (attenuating) feedback would decrease the 





Application of remaining carbon budgets to international and national climate policy 
Carbon budgets are a powerful guide for international policy, providing a way to gauge the 
consistency of national emission targets with global temperature goals. To do so, the total 
quantity of remaining CO2 emissions must first be distributed over time so as to align with the 
target years of national emission pledges. Figure 2 illustrates one such time distribution, in 
which a scenario of linearly decreasing CO2 emissions to zero at 2040 (for a 1.5 °C carbon 
budget) or 2060 (for “well below 2 °C” budget) is discretized into 5-year budgets that are 
compatible with the remaining carbon budget. Such subdivided budgets could be tracked and 
used to inform the 5-year global stocktake process as part of the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, whose mandate is to assess the consistency of emissions targets with the long-term 
temperature goal. Currently, emissions from national pledges are expected to exceed the near-
term budget allowances shown in Figure 280,81. This raises important questions of 
intergenerational equity as we are either accruing an emissions debt to future generations by 
borrowing allowable emissions from the future allowance, tasking future generations with the 
challenge of removing anthropogenic CO2 from the atmosphere, or we are committing these 
future generations to climate change in excess of our stated climate target.  
To be useful as a benchmark for national climate policy, the global remaining carbon budget 
must be further subdivided among nations. There are many choices involved in the distribution 
of the remaining global carbon budget to individual nations; such decisions often reflect different 
ways of accounting for unequal national circumstances3,4,82–85 (see Box 3). Given the contentious 
and highly context-specific nature of such distributions, the UNFCCC has chosen not to develop 
rules or instruct nations as to how to set their own emissions targets. National carbon budgets are 
therefore currently unilateral choices that can help nations to organize their mitigation efforts, 
but may not bear any real resemblance to or consistency with the overall global budget. 
Currently, many nations have designed their NDCs using the most generous of available 
allocation principles for their country83. This suggests a need for international mechanisms to 
promote the evaluation and iterative reassessment of national budget allowances to ensure 
consistency with the global budget (Box 3).  
Despite the challenges associated with fairly allocating the global budget to nations, the idea of a 
finite national carbon budget nevertheless has enormous conceptual importance for national 
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policy decisions. For example, short-term carbon budgets could be adopted and reported on in a 
manner similar to fiscal budgets86; the simple act of doing so has the potential to embed national 
climate targets in a much more tangible way across government decision-making processes. The 
recent adoption of national carbon budgets in the United Kingdom and the EU, including 
commitments to net-zero emissions by 2050, are good examples of such an approach. The 
adoption of finite national budgets would also lend new weight to discussions surrounding new 
infrastructure construction, and particularly new fossil fuel energy infrastructure. Two recent 
analyses suggest that global “committed emissions” associated with existing infrastructure (i.e. 
the future emissions that are expected to occur over the typical operating lifetime of existing 
infrastructure) are close to or exceed the remaining carbon budgets for our most ambitious 
climate targets87,88. The committed emissions associated with new infrastructure projects could 
therefore be weighed against a country’s remaining carbon budget to determine whether the 
infrastructure in question is consistent with our climate targets. Furthermore, should a given 
nation’s emissions exceed their share of the global budget, the resulting emission debts4,89 could 






Figure 2. Illustrative example of distributing the remaining carbon budget over time into 5-year discrete time 
intervals. The years of net-zero CO2 emissions shown here are approximately consistent with the estimates of the 
67th percentile remaining budgets from SR1.59 for 1.5 °C (420 GtCO2 after 2017; area under the blue line) and for 
an illustrative “well below 2 °C” interpretation, here taken to be 1.75 °C (800 GtCO2 after 2017; area under the 
yellow line). The red shaded regions indicate projected amounts over budget, reflecting estimates of global CO2 
emissions between now and 2030 following current national emission pledges (Nationally-Determined 
Contributions, or NDCs)81. We note that the linearly decreasing trajectories illustrated here are clearly an idealized 
scenario and do not incorporate aspects of cost-effectiveness; however, the small size of remaining carbon budgets 
for the Paris Agreement goal clearly requires stronger reductions in global CO2 emissions in the next decades than 





Box 3: Issues of fairness and equity when allocating the remaining carbon budget to countries 
Estimates of the remaining carbon budget provide a global envelope within which future societies have to operate 
if we intend to limit global warming to a specific level. However, translating this global budget to national 
allocations that define what would be an appropriate or fair share of this budget for a single country is an exercise 
fraught with value judgments which have little relation to the geophysical underpinnings of carbon budgets. Here, 
science can at best inform and quantify the implications of what are largely subjective choices by individual 
countries or systems to distribute quotas among countries. 
Over time, many so-called fairness or equity principles have been suggested and explored to try to understand 
what would be a fair allocation of the remaining carbon budget. These principles are largely based on concepts of 
responsibility, equality and capability across nations90 (Figure Box 3). Responsibility addresses the fact that 
countries have contributed differently to the warming we are currently experiencing, and have also had access to 
varying levels of understanding over time about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on the climate. Equality 
reflects the idea of the human right to development, and that each individual is entitled to equal access to the 
means of development. This principle can be used to imply an equal entitlement to the production of greenhouse 
gas emissions, though it is also the case that development can be achieved via low-emission technologies and 
activities. Capability reflects the fact that different countries can be in quite different positions regarding their 
capacity to address the challenge of climate change mitigation, be it in terms of financial resources, technical 
expertise or institutional context. Historically, this capability has been closely related to a country’s degree of 
industrialization, and its associated greenhouse gas emissions. These various principles are well established in the 
United Nationals Framework Convention on Climate Change which states that countries should participate in 
responding to climate change “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities and their social and economic conditions”. 
A wide variety of ways exist to translate these equity principles by means of quantitative proxies into a 
distribution method to allocate the global remaining carbon budget to particular countries83. The resulting 
allocations can be positive or negative; that is, they can represent either an emissions allowance or an emissions 
debt. Allocation methods also vary considerably in their degree of fairness, and some are generally considered to 
be explicitly unfair. For example, an equal-shares – or grandfathering – allocation approach is often used to claim 
future emissions rights based on the current distribution of emissions among countries. This allocation method 
does not account for differing historical responsibility or the history of colonial relationships among countries, 
and instead rewards historical polluters for their current high share of global emissions.  
Translating the global remaining carbon budget to country allocations is thus not a scientific-driven choice but 
one that represents an interplay and continuous discussion between ethics, justice, society and geophysics91,92 
(Figure Box 3). Currently, when either implicitly or explicitly selecting a fairness principle, countries almost 
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exclusively choose an approach that provides them with a disproportionately large share of the remaining carbon 
budget when seen from the perspective of another country93. This suggests an ongoing need for international 
cooperation and oversight to achieve consistency between national emissions budgets and international climate 
targets. 
 
Figure Box 3. Allocating the global remaining carbon budget to individual nations. Any such allocation 
requires subjective choices and application of fairness principles related to a country’s responsibility for climate 
changes, its capability to achieve mitigation goals, and the importance of equality among countries. Coherence 
between the sum of national allocations and the global allowable budget is unlikely to emerge from this 






Policy implications of a finite remaining carbon budget 
The most important policy implication of a finite carbon budget is the need to achieve net-zero 
CO2 emissions in order to stabilize global temperature. This framing has been used to inform 
ongoing and ambitious mitigation efforts in 71 countries and over 100 cities, as well as over 500 
businesses that have set net-zero emission targets for a specified year81. The concept of a carbon 
budget has therefore been an effective communication tool in mobilizing individual countries or 
regions to set net-zero emission reduction targets. However, it is important to reiterate that in 
order to be consistent with Paris temperature goals, a net-zero CO2 emission target must also be 
accompanied by aggressive mitigation of non-CO2 emissions such as methane, nitrous oxide and 
black carbon. Both net-zero CO2 emissions and decreasing non-CO2 forcing are likely required 
to achieve stable global temperatures73. 
Another important policy implication is that the size of the remaining carbon budget is sensitive 
to societal choices for mitigating non-CO2 emissions, as well as the effect of CO2 mitigation 
efforts on co-emitted non-CO2 species10,11,94. However, while the remaining carbon budget is 
sensitive to non-CO2 emission scenarios, it does not dictate a particular CO2 mitigation pathway 
over time. This, in turn, highlights the important question of whether CO2 emissions exceeding 
the budget can be reversed via carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. While the climate 
response to positive and negative CO2 emissions has been shown to be approximately 
symmetrical55,77, CDR technologies are expensive and challenging to deploy at scale95,96, and 
will also need to remove CO2 that oceans and lands will release again in response to declining 
atmospheric CO297–99. Furthermore, the technologies used to produce and remove CO2 emissions 
will likely not produce (or remove) the same types or quantities of co-emitted non-CO2 
emissions. Current scientific understanding therefore suggests that it will neither be easy nor 
necessarily possible to achieve the level of CDR required to swiftly reverse the effect of 
substantial emissions in excess of the available budget99,100, particularly with respect to long-
timescale responses such as sea level99 or other changes in the marine environment101,102. 
Finally, there remain substantial challenges associated with how to equitably share the remaining 
carbon budget among nations83,93. Issues of fairness are have been interpreted differently across 
nations, with the result that the sum of all current national targets would produce emissions that  
exceed the global budget for limiting warming to 1.5 °C or “well below 2 °C” 83,93. This in turn 
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suggests means that many of the countries who have presented their current targets as “fair and 
ambitious”61 have in fact adopted targets that are neither. To achieve a coherent set of national 
allocations that reflect principles of fairness and are also consistent with the global budget, it will 
be essential to empower and strengthen international cooperation to achieve an iterative process 
of evaluating and strengthening national carbon budgets. 
Carbon budgets are a powerful conceptual tool with clear potential to inform climate policy.  
Estimates of the remaining carbon budget can be used as a benchmark for international targets, 
and as a rationale for setting and monitoring progress towards net-zero national CO2 emissions 
targets. The latest estimates of the remaining carbon budget suggest that while the global budget 
is small and rapidly decreasing, there is nevertheless a reasonable chance that the Paris 
Agreement goals remain within reach. However, this window of opportunity is closing with each 
passing year of tentative and insufficient action. Halting climate change at acceptable levels will 
require large and rapid increases in effort on the part of both international and national players in 
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